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 Reflection on the implications of the study of nature for Christian teaching 
spans the history of the church. This reflection increasingly took on the tone of 
debate with the transitions marking the “modern” age in Western culture. 
However, this age also fostered periodic efforts to reframe the interchange 
between science and religious faith into constructive dialogue, seeking to deepen 
understanding of the differences and heighten appreciation for the areas of 
resonance. The last two decades have witnessed a vigorous effort at such “science 
and religion dialogue.”1 
 While the current dialogue has yielded many insights, it has been 
hampered by the tendency to construe “religion” too abstractly. At the most 
extreme, religion is viewed as a human trait that is assumed to be expressed in all 
religious traditions. In reality, as the other religious traditions have protested, this 
supposed generic trait typically reflected convictions of the religions of the 
Middle East (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam). As such, the most helpful recent 
studies have begun to pay attention 
 
1For typological surveys of the dialogue, see John F. Haught, Science and 
Religion: From Conflict to Conversation (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist, 1996); Niels 
Henrik Gregersen & J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, eds., Rethinking Theology and 
Science: Six Models for the Current Dialogue (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998); 
and Ted Peters, “Science and Theology: Toward Consonance,” in Science and 
Theology, edited by T. Peters (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998), 11–39. 
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to how the focus of concern about current scientific claims and practices may 
differ between major world religions. 
 But the problematic impact of abstraction finds expression as well within 
major religions. In particular, the range of variance in evaluating scientific claims 
and practices can be as wide between alternative theological camps within 
Christianity as it is between Christians and other religious or secular stances. If 
we hope to increase mutual understanding and cooperation among Christians in 
their engagement with the natural sciences, we need to pay more attention to the 
relevant characteristic and/or distinctive convictions and concerns of the major 
theological traditions within the Christian church.  
My purpose here is to start a conversation about this topic within the 
Wesleyan tradition. I attempt this by probing John Wesley’s engagement with the 
study of nature in his day, watching for the convictions and concerns that emerge, 
and suggesting their relevance for our own setting. 
 
Historical Perspective for Engaging Wesley’s Precedent 
 
 Few would question that John Wesley might provide an instructive 
precedent for reflections on spiritual formation practices in our postmodern 
setting. Turning to Wesley for insights about constructive theological engagement 
with the natural sciences in our day is a much less obvious proposal. To 
understand why this is the case, and yet why a small—but growing—number of 
scholars are embracing the latter project, it will be helpful to begin with some 
historical perspective. 
 
Early Influential Dismissals.  The proposal that one might want to 
consider Wesley when looking for insights about constructive theological 
engagement with the natural sciences would have astonished Sir Leslie Stephen, 
author of a two-volume History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century 
published in 1876. Writing nearly a century after Wesley’s death, Stephen assured 
his readers that “we already find in Wesley the aversion to scientific reasoning 
which has become characteristic [in Stephen’s day] of orthodox theologians.”2 
Andrew Dickson White echoed this evaluation twenty years later in his 
(in)famous History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom, 
citing Wesley several times as an influential proponent of beliefs that stifled the 
emergence of modern  
 
2Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century 
(London: Smith, Elder, & Co., 1876), 2:412. 
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science.3 For both writers, the leading indictment against Wesley was his 
openness to demonic causes of affliction and the possibility of witches, closely 
intertwined with his corollary providential accounts of events like earthquakes 
and his expectation of miraculous healing. Also highlighted by White was 
Wesley’s ascription to the Genesis account of creation, where animals are 
portrayed as naturally domesticated to humans and all death results from human 
sin, assumptions that conflict directly with the Darwinian model of evolution.4 
 The most significant problem with these influential dismissals of Wesley’s 
precedent for engaging the natural sciences is that they rely mainly on secondary 
sources and passing comments in Wesley’s Sermons and Journal. As a result, 
they provide little sense of the scope of Wesley’s engagement with the natural 
sciences—or “natural philosophy” as it was pursued in his day. In 1763 Wesley 
published for the benefit of his Methodist preachers and people A Survey of the 
Wisdom of God in Creation; or, A Compendium of Natural Philosophy, a two-
volume work distilling his reading of several book-length works as well as 
extracts from the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society and other 
journals. By its third edition in 1777 this Survey had grown into a five-volume 
collection. To increase its availability to his followers, Wesley serialized excerpts 
from the Survey in his monthly Arminian Magazine beginning in 1781. In 
addition, Wesley also published The Desideratum; or, Electricity Made Plain and 
Useful (1760) and a number of independent short pieces on topics in natural 
philosophy in the Arminian Magazine. This breadth of material surely qualifies 
Wesley for consideration as a precedent for theological engagement with science 
topics, particularly among the various branches of his ecclesial offspring. 
 
Problematic Idealized Appeals.  One must be aware of Wesley’s broader 
work to understand the earliest positive appeals to his precedent in engaging the 
natural sciences, which were contemporaneous with White’s dismissal—and 
equally problematic. In 1893 William Harrison Mills gave a lecture titled “John 
Wesley an Evolutionist” at the Chit-Chat Club in San Francisco. The lecture was 
circulated as a booklet and a summary  
 
3Andrew Dickson White, History of the Warfare of Science with Theology 
in Christendom (New York: D. Appleton, 1896), esp. 1:128, 148, 340, 361–63, 
2:125–26. 
4Cf. ibid., 1:29–30, 220, 289. 
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was published in Popular Science Monthly the following year.5 Sparked by Mills, 
James W. Lee enlightened readers of the Southern Magazine the same year that 
“the founder of Methodism wrote out the whole theory of evolution and the origin 
of species. . .eighty-four years before Mr. Darwin published his celebrated work 
upon the same subject.”6 The main difference between Darwin and Wesley, 
according to Lee, concerned causation—what Darwin attributed to natural 
selection and survival of the fittest, Wesley attributed to the will of God. 
 Both Mills and Lee assumed their contention would be surprising, even to 
Methodists, because so few were familiar with Wesley’s Survey of the Wisdom of 
God. They based their argument on extracts from the Survey, particularly from 
volume 4, which offers a sketch of the “gradual progression of beings” that 
climaxes: 
 
By what degrees does nature raise herself up to man? How will she 
rectify this head, that is always inclined towards the earth? How 
change these paws into flexible arms? What method will she make 
use of to transform these crooked feet into supple and skillful 
hands? Or how will she widen and extend this contracted stomach? 
In what manner will she place the breasts, and give them a 
roundness suitable to them? The ape is this rough draught of man; 
this rude sketch and imperfect representation; which, nevertheless, 
bears a resemblance to him and is the last creature that serves to 
display the admirable progression of the works of God!7 
 
The problem with the appeals of Mills and Lee to this passage is not that it 
is from Wesley’s abridgement of a book by Charles Bonnet (for Wesley is 
endorsing Bonnet), but that they were blind to the setting of the original quote. 
Wesley was embracing here the philosophical model of the  
 
5William Harrison Mills, John Wesley an Evolutionist (San Francisco: 
Chit-Chat Club, 1893); summarized in “John Wesley an Evolutionist,” Popular 
Science Monthly 46 (1894–95): 284–85. 
6See James W. Lee, “A Methodist Evolutionist,” Southern Magazine 
(Louisville) 4 (1894): 348–54; here, 348. 
7See John Wesley, A Survey of the Wisdom of God in the Creation, or A 
Compendium of Natural Philosophy, 4th edn. (London: Paramore, 1784), 4:102. 
Unless noted otherwise, all references will be to this last edition published under 
Wesley’s direction. Mills quotes this passage in John Wesley, 18; Lee in 
“Methodist Evolutionist,” 350. 
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“chain of being” that remained popular in the eighteenth century.8 A central claim 
of this model is that creation demonstrates the perfection of its Creator by its 
organization into an exhaustively populated series of progressively more complex 
beings—from the simplest elements to the highest spiritual beings. Importantly, 
precisely because it was meant to demonstrate an immutable God, this chain of 
beings was considered static! The progressive description of beings as “higher” or 
“next” did not indicate their temporal succession. They were assumed to have 
come into being at the same instant, each as a unique creation of God, and the 
possibility of change or extinction of any species of being was specifically 
rejected. They were simply being described sequentially. Thus, Wesley was 
hardly offering a prescient version of Darwin’s theory of evolution. 
 The claims of Mills and Lee were shaped more by the emerging 
fundamentalist/modernist tensions of their time than by contextual study of 
Wesley. This continued to be the case for a series of popular essays in the 1920s 
that invoked Wesley as a forerunner for accepting evolution in the midst of the 
controversy peaking in the Scopes trial (1926).9 If there was anything new in 
efforts of this period, it was a tendency to broaden the argument, presenting 
Wesley as a pioneer of scientific empiricism in general (in the mode of Francis 
Bacon and John Locke) and of empirical theology in particular.10 As one 
champion put it: “Back to Wesley is forward into the spirit of what is best in the 
twentieth century.”11 In striking contrast to Stephen and White, another insisted: 
 
8The standard study of this model is Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain 
of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1961). 
9Francis M. Larkin, “Evolution,” California Christian Advocate 61 (6 
April 1922): 4; Karl Stoolz, “John Wesley and Evolution,” Christian Century 40 
(1923): 663; Frank Wilbur Collier, Back to Wesley (New York: Methodist Book 
Concern, 1924), 34–49; Charles W. Hargitt, “John Wesley—Evolutionist,” Zion’s 
Herald 103 (26 August 1925): 1061, 1088; and Frank Louis Barber, “Wesley, an 
Evolutionist,” Canadian Journal of Religious Thought 4 (1927): 28–33. 
10See in particular Frank Louis Barber, The Philosophy of John Wesley 
(Toronto: Methodist Book & Publishing House, 1923); Charles W. Hargitt, “John 
Wesley and Science: A Challenge from the Eighteenth Century,” Methodist 
Review 110 (May 1927): 383–93; William C. S. Pellowe, “Wesley’s Use of 
Science,” Methodist Review 112 (May 1927): 394–403; and Frank Wilbur Collier, 
John Wesley Among the Scientists (New York: Abingdon, 1928). Each included 
the suggestion that Wesley was open to evolution in some form. 
11Collier, Back to Wesley, 5. Collier was a professor of philosophy, trained 
in Boston Personalism and teaching at American University in Washington D.C. 
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While not a few among Wesley’s contemporary clergy were 
noisily engaged in anathematizing such scientists as Newton, 
Kepler, La Voisier, Boyle and Priestly,. . .this man, busiest of all 
his cult, found time to acquaint himself with scientific progress and 
cordially accepted it … [which is] a splendid lesson and 
admonition to intolerant and benighted successors of the twentieth 
century.12 
 
Emerging Contextual Studies.  The lesson actually dawning on Wesley’s 
successors by the mid-twentieth century was that both the earlier dismissals and 
the sweeping panegyrics lacked balance and nuance.13 They were not sufficiently 
aware of the specific options in the engagement of theology and natural science, 
or of the various factors influencing choices between these options—in Wesley’s 
time or in their own. Accordingly, they “read” Wesley anachronistically as 
exemplifying current positions which they either rejected or championed.14 
 An essential resource in guarding against such misreading is careful 
historical-contextual study of Wesley’s writings on science topics. The first 
serious effort in this regard was published in 1953 by Robert Schofield, professor 
of the history of science at Harvard University.15 While clear that Wesley could 
not be considered a “scientist” by even eighteenth-century standards, Schofield 
judged that he had broader and more enduring interest in scientific studies than 
most of his university-educated peers. Wesley’s experimentation with and writing 
on electricity was given particular notice. Most significantly, allowing that there 
were better specialized treatments of each subject area covered in Wesley’s 
Survey of the Wisdom of God, Shofield suggested that there was likely no better 
single survey treatment for general readers.16 Shofield suggested  
 
12Hargitt, “John Wesley and Science,” 393. For a somewhat more reserved 
encomium, see Pellowe, “Wesley’s Use of Science,” 403.  
13An early expression of emerging caution are the chapters on science and 
evolution in William C. S. Pellowe, John Wesley: Master in Religion (Nashville: 
MECS Publishing House, 1939), 97–121. 
14This point is developed well, with focus on the readings championing 
Wesley, in Laura Bartels Felleman, “John Wesley’s Survey of the Wisdom of God 
in Creation: A Methodological Inquiry,” Perspectives on Science and Christian 
Faith 58 (2006): 1–6. 
15Robert E. Schofield, “John Wesley and Science in 18th Century 
England,” Isis 44 (1953): 331–40. 
16Cf. ibid., 337–38. 
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that the biases of Wesley which ran most counter to elements that account for the 
advance of modern science were his negative attitudes toward mathematics and 
hypothetical theories.17 
 While helpful, Schofield’s essay antedated the flourishing of study of the 
history of science over the last few decades, and particularly of investigations into 
Christian interactions with science.18 This makes it all the more regrettable that 
his essay remained the only serious historical study for forty years. Fortunately, 
this situation is beginning to change. In the early 1990s John English provided the 
first rigorous account of Wesley’s academic training in the various fields of the 
study of nature in his day, as well as a nuanced evaluation of Wesley’s fluctuating 
sympathies in the current debates over Isaac Newton’s cosmology.19 Shortly 
thereafter, John Haas published three general essays that draw on some of the 
recent scholarship to contextualize Wesley’s basic interest in science topics.20  
 Given Wesley’s reliance on multiple sources (often without citation) for 
his publications, a pressing foundational task is identification of his sources and 
consideration of how he selectively adopts and adapts them. In the first 
dissertation ever focused on Wesley’s Survey, Laura Bartels Felleman has 
recently demonstrated the insight that can emerge from such study.21 This type of 
textual work is farthest along in the specific area of Wesley’s publications on 
medicine (which includes the Desideratum on  
 
17Ibid., 338. 
18Two recent works that can provide a sense of these developments are 
Peter J. Bowler & Iwan Rhys Morus, Making Modern Science: A Historical 
Survey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); David C. Lindberg & 
Ronald L. Numbers, eds., When Science and Christianity Meet (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2003). 
19See John Cammel English, “John Wesley’s Scientific Education,” 
Methodist History 30.1 (1991): 42–51; and English, “John Wesley and Isaac 
Newton’s ‘System of the World’,” Proceedings of the Wesley Historical Society 
48 (1991): 69–86. 
20John W. Haas, Jr., “John Wesley’s Views on Science and Christianity: 
An Examination of the Charge of Antiscience,” Church History 63 (1994): 378–
92; Haas, “Eighteenth Century Evangelical Responses to Science: John Wesley’s 
Enduring Legacy,” Science and Christian Belief 6 (1994): 83–102; and Haas, 
“John Wesley’s Vision of Science in the Service of Christ,” Perspectives on 
Science and Christian Faith 47 (1995): 234–43. 
21Laura Bartels Felleman, “The Evidence of Things Not Seen: John 
Wesley’s Use of Natural Philosophy” (Drew University Ph.D. thesis, 2004). 
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electricity).22 The project of providing a critical edition of the full Survey of the 
Wisdom of God, identifying all sources and the changes through various editions, 
is just getting underway.23 
 As adequate critical text is provided it becomes possible to explore more 
deeply the contextual dynamics and characteristic concerns of Wesley’s 
engagement with his sources. Here again, the most developed studies to-date 
focus on Wesley’s ventures in medicine.24 But enough of a broader sense is 
emerging to highlight a few items, in hopes of stimulating both additional 
historical studies of the range of Wesley’s engagement with science topics and 
hermeneutically-sensitive reflections on the insights that might be drawn from his 
precedent. 
 
Character of the “Science” that Wesley Engaged 
 
 We need to begin with some comments on the character of the “science” 
that Wesley engaged. I have put scare quotes around the word because Wesley 
inhabited a transitional period prior to the solidifying of many aspects commonly 
associated with science today. Three points deserve to be highlighted in this 
regard. 
 
 First, Wesley’s century was a period of major transition in the self-
understanding of the academic study of nature about its goals and methods.  
This is important to emphasize because an earlier generation of historiography 
(e.g., Herbert Butterfield, The Origins of Modern  
 
22See particularly James G. Donat, “The Rev. John Wesley’s Extractions 
from Dr. Tissot: A Methodist Imprimatur,” History of Science 39 (2001): 285–98; 
and Donat, “Empirical Medicine in the 18th Century: The Rev. John Wesley’s 
Search for Remedies that Work,” Methodist History 44 (2006): 216–26. Donat is 
editor of the future volume (17) which collects John Wesley’s medical writings in 
The Works of John Wesley, edited by Frank Baker and Richard Heitzenrater 
(Nashville: Abingdon, 1984—). Note: hereafter this collection is referred to 
simply as Works. 
23This project is being supported by the Center for Studies in the 
Wesleyan Tradition at Duke University, under my direction. 
24See Deborah Madden, “A Cheap, Safe and Natural Medicine”: Religion, 
Medicine and Culture in John Wesley’s “Primitive Physic” (Atlanta: Rodopi, 
2007); Randy L. Maddox, “John Wesley on Holistic Health and Healing,” 
Methodist History 46 (2007): 4–33; and Randy L. Maddox, “Reclaiming the 
Eccentric Parent: Methodist Reception of John Wesley’s Interest in Medicine,” in 
“Inward and Outward Health”: John Wesley’s Holistic Concept of Medical 
Science, the Environment, and Holy Living, edited by Deborah Madden (London: 
Epworth, 2008), 15-50. 
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Science25) presented the “scientific revolution” as taking place rapidly across 
seventeenth-century Europe. They suggested that “science” was understood in 
England by the outset of the eighteenth century among leading practitioners like 
Isaac Newton as a mode of inquiry that was: (1) independent from religious or 
philosophical constraints, thus equally at home in all cultures and times; (2) aimed 
at elucidating how the processes of nature work, so that these processes could be 
used for human betterment; and (3) grounded in a hypothetico-deductive 
methodology, wedding the certainty of mathematics with the objectivity of 
rigorous empirical verification of hypotheses. If this model was firmly in place by 
Wesley’s day, any divergence evident in his writings from these emphases is 
easily read as resistance to or rejection of science (as by Stephen and White). 
 But scholars of the history of science over the last two decades have 
demonstrated that the various emphases just listed for the “modern” 
understanding of science remained contested among leading practitioners through 
most of the eighteenth century, particularly in England.26 This recent scholarship 
encourages us to take seriously that folk like Isaac Newton labeled their studies of 
nature not “science” but “natural philosophy” (e.g., Newton’s Philosophiae 
Naturalis Principia Mathematica, 1697).27 They stress that this latter name 
reflects important continuities with an earlier understanding of the academic study 
of nature. 
 Some background is necessary to appreciate this earlier understanding. 
Influenced by Aristotle’s distinction between epistēmē and technē—which passed 
over into Latin as scientia and ars (art)—medieval educational practices stressed 
the difference between pursuing understanding of reality (scientia) and acquiring 
practical knowledge or know-how (ars). One implication was that vocational 
skills pursued on their own, usually by the lower or servant classes (the illiberales 
ars, or arts of the non-free), were not part of a university education. But the 
distinction also found expression in university education. The base of this 
education was training in the seven liberal arts (i.e., necessary skills for free 
men): grammar, rhetoric,  
 
25London: G. Bell, 1949. 
26See Andrew Cunningham & Perry Williams, “De-centering the ‘Big 
Picture’: The Origins of Modern Science and the Modern Origins of Science,” 
British Journal for the History of Science 26 (1993): 407–32; and, more generally, 
Bowler & Morus, Making Modern Science. 
27Cf. Andrew Cunningham, “How the Principia got its Name,” History of 
Science 29 (1991): 377–92. 
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dialectic, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music. These sets of practical 
knowledge provided the foundation for students to approach the capstone study of 
the nature of reality itself (scientia)—in philosophy and theology. By the 
eighteenth century, philosophy had developed sub-divisions of logic, 
metaphysics, moral philosophy, and natural philosophy. The specific focus of the 
latter was on understanding the natural world (it was often also called “physics,” 
echoing the Greek word for nature: physis). 
 We can illuminate the assumptions of natural philosophy about its task 
and methods as it entered the eighteenth century.28 Consider the specific case of 
studying the heavens. As a scientia, natural philosophy traditionally focused on 
questions like what the heavens are made of; what moves the sun, moon, and 
planets; and whether the universe is finite or infinite. By contrast, astronomy, as 
an art (integrally connected to mathematics), was concerned with tracking lights 
in the sky, developing formalized descriptions and predictions of their 
movements, offering reliable calendars, and other such practical tasks. It had been 
rare for astronomers to ask what the heavenly bodies were made of or why they 
moved, while natural philosophers had devoted little attention to mathematics or 
the practical use of their explanations of reality.29 
 Challenges to these disciplinary distinctions began to emerge in the late 
seventeenth century. On one front, Francis Bacon injected the suggestion, which 
gained increasing hold, that the value of any study of nature was proportionate to 
the technological benefits it provided for human control and exploitation of the 
natural world. On another front, Newton’s Principia Mathematica began to 
elevate the centrality of mathematics to accounts of the nature of the universe. By 
the turn to the nineteenth century, these and other threads had woven together the 
distinct agendas of scientia and ars in the study of nature. This reality was 
signaled by the fading of the label “natural philosophy,” with “science” in its 
modern sense taking its place. 
 The key point, for our purposes, is that this transition stretched through the 
eighteenth century in England, resulting in numerous works  
 
28This summary draws on several sources; one of the most recent is Peter 
Dear, The Intelligibility of Nature: How Science Makes Sense of the World 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 1–14. 
29Cf. Peter Dear, “The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy: 
Toward a Heuristic Narrative for the Scientific Revolution,” Configurations 6 
(1998): 173–93. 
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with mixtures of the relevant emphases. Few works in this period embody 
consistently the assumptions of “modern science” outlined earlier, including 
Wesley’s Survey. The fact that in this “compendium of natural philosophy” 
Wesley discounted the role of mathematics, for example, is evidence less of his 
intentional resistance to a recognized commitment of “science” than of his 
location in this transitional period. 
 
 Second, Wesley’s transitional century was marked by prolonged debate 
among competing models of physics and cosmology, with particular focus on 
the perceived limitations of Newton’s proposals.  This is important to emphasize 
because a common evidence cited by critics to show that Wesley was anti-science 
was his hesitance about endorsing Newton. Recent surveys of eighteenth-century 
science in England make clear that a number of Newton’s professional peers 
shared this hesitance, and for understandable reasons.30 Everyone recognized that, 
with its mathematical advances (particularly calculus), Newton’s Principia 
provided a much more accurate description of the movement of the planets, 
comets, and tides. But this was a task traditionally assigned to the art of 
astronomy, not the explanatory goal of natural philosophy, which Newton 
claimed in the full title of his work. Thus, Newton’s Principia was often greeted 
at first with stunned incomprehension, even at his own University of 
Cambridge.31 
 A little background may help in understanding this reaction. Through most 
of the medieval period the reigning physics was that of Aristotle, which accounted 
for all natural motion by “final causes” that were integral to every type of being. 
Thus planets moved in their orbits because they were realizing their entelechy (the 
“desire to fulfill one’s nature”). By the latter medieval period, however, many 
were dissatisfied with the subtle pan-psychic suggestions of this explanation, 
spawning alternative mechanical accounts of motion in the heavens. The starting 
premise of these accounts was that entelechy was limited to living beings;  
 
30Good surveys of these debates are available in Peter Hanns Reill, “The 
Legacy of the ‘Scientific Revolution’: Science and the Enlightenment,” in The 
Cambridge History of Science, Vol. IV: The Eighteenth Century, ed. Roy Porter 
(New York: Cambridge, 2003), 23–43; John Gascoigne, “Ideas of Nature: Natural 
Philosophy,” in ibid., 285–304; and William B. Ashworth, “Christianity and the 
Mechanistic Universe,” in Lindberg & Numbers, When Science and Christianity 
Meet, 61–84. 
31Gascoigne, “Ideas of Nature,” 289. 
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physical matter was inert, and was moved solely by the application of external 
force. But how was this force applied?  
Here a divergence emerged within mechanical accounts of cosmic motion, 
framed by the question of whether space was a void. Accepting that space was a 
void made it difficult to account for application of force at a distance, such as the 
influence of the moon on the earth’s ocean tides. So most thinkers insisted that 
space was entirely filled by matter of varying size, including sizes not visible to 
human observation. René Descartes developed the most sophisticated mechanical 
account in this vein, ascribing planetary motion to the carrying force of vortices in 
this cosmic soup. If one instead accepted that space was a void, they typically 
either attributed motion to direct causation by God or echoed earlier hermetic 
suggestions about “resonance” across distance between certain elements. 
 Newton stepped into the middle of these ongoing debates. Aligning with 
the mechanists, he rejected entelechy, agreeing that matter was inert. Yet he 
eventually spurned Descartes’s hypothesis of forms of matter too small for 
empirical detection, leaving him with space as a void. While he was willing to 
speak about God intervening occasionally to adjust the motion of planets and 
other cosmic bodies, Newton believed that the regularity and interdependence of 
this motion indicated instead the presence of an abiding natural law. He named 
this law of mutual influence of bodies upon each another “gravity.” But he 
immediately conceded that he could not yet explain how gravity conveyed its 
impact across the void of space. To many of his peers, Newton’s “gravity” 
seemed like another unacceptable appeal to hermetic influences. Others concluded 
simply that he had failed to do what natural philosophers were supposed to do—
provide an account of how the movements of bodies take place. 
 In hindsight, Newton ventured a promising suggestion about how gravity 
worked in the “General Scholium” he added to the 2nd edition (1713) of Principia. 
At the end of this short piece he referred to an “electric and elastic spirit” that 
appears to pervade and lay hid in all gross bodies, noting that there was not yet 
sufficient experimental input to provide an account of its impact.32 It would take a 
century for further experimentation to result in James Maxwell’s account of the 
dynamics of electromagnetic fields, and the correlation of these with gravitational 
fields.  
 
32See Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica, 2nd edn. (Cambridge, 
1713), 484; in first English translation, The Mathematical Principles of Natural 
Philosophy (London: Benjamin Motte, 1729), 2:393. 
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Only at this point was the project of Newton’s Principia as a “natural philosophy” 
fully achieved. It is anachronistic to fault those who do not endorse a significant 
proposed revision of a field of knowledge early in the process, simply because of 
the eventual success of the proposal. This point has been made effectively against 
those who criticize the church for not adopting Galileo’s cosmology immediately, 
when a number of his relevant “scientific” peers still harbored significant 
questions.33 The same would apply through much of the eighteenth century in 
regard to Newton’s physics and cosmology. 
 The key point, for our purposes, is not just to suggest that there was some 
legitimate room for Wesley to be hesitant in endorsing Newton. His awareness of 
the ongoing disagreement between competing models, and of Newton’s precedent 
for not advancing explanatory accounts until there was compelling evidence, also 
help explain the restriction Wesley adopted in his edited collation of works in 
natural philosophy: 
 
It will be easily observed that I endeavor throughout not to account 
for things, but only to describe them. I undertake barely to set 
down what appears in nature, not the cause of those appearances. 
The facts lie within the reach of our senses and understanding, the 
causes are more remote. That things are so, we know with 
certainty; but why they are so, we know not. In many cases we 
cannot know; and the more we enquire, the more we are perplexed 
and entangled.34 
 
Obviously, this restricted goal falls short of the full agenda of natural philosophy. 
But Wesley’s Survey was not intended to advance this discipline; it had the more 
limited goal of providing for his readers a survey of the most interesting and 
instructive aspects of nature as highlighted in recent work in natural philosophy. 
 
 Third, in Wesley’s transitional setting, “natural philosophy” retained an 
overarching theological concern.  If we wanted to take the time, we could 
consider counter-evidence to all three of the major emphases of “modern science” 
that Butterfield and others suggested were  
 
33Cf. David C. Lindberg, “Galileo, the Church, and the Cosmos,” in 
Lindberg & Numbers, When Science and Christianity Meet, 33–60. 
34Wesley, Preface, §5, Survey, 1:vi–vii; also in The Works of John Wesley, 
edited by Thomas Jackson (London: Wesleyan Methodist Book Room, 1872), 
14:301. Note: hereafter this collection is referred to as Works (Jackson). 
  36
                                                
in place by the outset of the eighteenth century in England. Newton’s strong 
contrast between his adherence to experimental induction and the reliance of 
Descartes and others upon unwarranted metaphysical hypotheses is just one 
example that a self-conscious integrated hypothetico-deductive methodology was 
far from shared. Likewise, Newton’s deferral of an account of how gravity 
conveyed its effect fits poorly with the second emphasis listed above. But the 
suggestion of earlier historiography with which recent scholars have taken the 
most exception is the sharp separation of “scientific” investigation from religious 
or theological considerations. 
 These scholars have argued that, in keeping with its medieval roots, 
natural philosophy at the outset of the eighteenth century retained an overarching 
theological goal.35 Its subject-matter was nature, but it approached nature as the 
“book of God’s works.” Moreover, it assumed that part of its task was to elucidate 
the attributes of God that could be demonstrated from God’s works. Newton can 
again serve as our example. The “General Scholium” that he added as the 
capstone to Principia was devoted mainly to insisting that “this most beautiful 
system of the sun, planets, and comets could only proceed from the counsel and 
dominion of an intelligent and powerful being,” and then elucidating the attributes 
of this being which we can deduce from “his most wise and excellent 
contrivances of things.” Newton concluded these reflections with an explicit 
affirmation that such discourse about God, drawn from consideration of nature, 
“does certainly belong to natural philosophy.”36 
 To be sure, there were occasional figures like Thomas Hobbes who 
adopted purely materialistic accounts of nature, but these remained rare in  
 
35This point was pressed initially by Andrew Cunningham in “Getting the 
Game Right: Some Plain Words on the Identity and Invention of Science,” 
Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 19 (1988): 365–89. The sharpest 
critic of Cunningham has been Edward Grant—cf. “God, Science, and Natural 
Philosophy in the Late Middle Ages,” in Between Demonstration and 
Imagination, eds. L. Nauta & A. Vanderjagt (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 243–67; and 
“God and Natural Philosophy: The Late Middle Ages and Sir Isaac Newton,” 
Early Science and Medicine 5 (2000): 279–98. Most have come to agree in 
general with Cunningham, as evidenced by Peter Dear, “Religion, Science and 
Natural Philosophy: Thoughts on Cunningham’s Thesis,” Studies in the History 
and Philosophy of Science 32 (2001): 377–86; and Peter Harrison, “‘Science’ and 
‘Religion’: Constructing the Boundaries,” Journal of Religion 86 (2006): 81–106. 
36Newton, Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy 2:388–92. 
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England into the last quarter of the eighteenth century.37 Thus, Wesley was 
echoing the methodological assumption of most of his sources when he described 
the goal of his compendium of natural philosophy as “not barely to entertain an 
idle barren curiosity, but to display the invisible things of God, his power, 
wisdom, and goodness.”38 If Wesley went beyond his sources, it was in his 
characteristic hope that the collection would also “warm our hearts, and fill our 
mouths with wonder, love, and praise!”39 
 
Characteristics of Wesley’s Theological Engagement with “Science” 
 
 The more that careful historical study highlights the differences between 
the “science” that Wesley engaged and science as dominant today, the more that 
one might doubt the relevance of Wesley’s precedent for current theological 
engagement with the natural sciences. But I would suggest that this difference is 
one of the things that make dialogue with Wesley valuable. If engaged with 
empathy, the dialogue can increase our awareness of the range of options 
available for relating theology and the natural sciences. It can also increase 
sensitivity to the contextuality of current reigning scientific models.  
One assumption shared by both the dismissals of Wesley’s precedent and 
the idealized appeals to him as a forerunner at the turn to the twentieth century 
was confidence in the superiority of their own modern view; Wesley was worth 
considering only to the degree that he agreed with that view. Like David Ford, I 
appreciate how our “postmodern” situation has encouraged us to challenge 
modernity’s undue superiority complex, allowing us to recognize in a new way 
what is of value in premodernity, modernity, and postmodernity.40 
 In this spirit, I want to highlight five characteristics of Wesley’s 
theological engagement with “science” (or the study of nature), which have been 
selected in part because of their resonance with strands in the science and religion 
dialogue of the past two decades. I would stress that I am not hereby trying to 
rehabilitate Wesley, or show him a prescient precursor of current positions. My 
goal is more like the hermeneutic quest of  
 
37See Jeremy Gregory, “Christianity and Culture: Religion, the Arts, and 
the Sciences in England, 1660–1800,” in Culture and Society in Britain, 1660–
1800, edited by Jeremy Black (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), 
102–23. 
38Wesley, Preface, §1, Survey, 1:iii–iv; in Works (Jackson), 14:300. 
39Ibid., §7, 1:viii; in Works (Jackson), 14:302. 
40David F. Ford, The Shape of Living (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1997), 21. 
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“merging horizons” between different contexts, in order to facilitate exchange of 
insights. I would also note that my list is far from exhaustive, being intended more 
as proposals for continuing research and dialogue. 
 
1.  Committed to a Modest Natural Theology.  It was just noted that 
natural philosophy retained a theological dimension in Wesley’s day, devoting 
some attention to implications that could be drawn from study of the material 
world about the existence and nature of spiritual beings, including the Ultimate 
Being or God. This attention intersected with another subsection of philosophy in 
the medieval curriculum known as “natural theology.” The latter was devoted to 
knowledge about God that could be demonstrated by rational reflection on (1) the 
human soul; (2) human moral insight, or “natural law”; and (3) the natural world. 
Thus, natural theology drew the culminating reflections of natural philosophy into 
a larger conversation about what could theoretically be known about God apart 
from special revelation. I stress the theoretical nature of this knowledge because 
natural theology was part of the Christian curriculum and its wisest practitioners 
were aware that they were reflecting on the “book of nature” through lenses 
shaped to some degree by the “book of scripture.” Their concern was less to elicit 
faith from non-believers than to confirm and enrich nascent faith.41 
 To be sure, not all voices were so wise. There was plenty of fodder to fuel 
the suspicion of Protestant reformers about the triumph of unregenerate reason 
over revelation in the enterprise of natural theology. This is not to say that the 
reformers set the enterprise fully aside. At the very least, they retained some 
emphasis on universally demonstrable “natural law” as a basis for civil society.42 
John Calvin went further, affirming that study of nature was a beneficial 
supplement to study of scripture for those who had the opportunity.43 But the 
general Protestant emphasis was on  
 
41Nicholas Wolterstorff develops this point in “The Migration of the 
Theistic Arguments: From Natural Theology to Evidentialist Apologetics,” in 
Rationality, Religious Belief, and Moral Commitment, edited by R. Audi & W. 
Wainwright (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 38–81. 
42For this emphasis in the Lutheran setting, see Sachiko Kusukawa, The 
Transformation of Natural Philosophy: The Case of Philip Melanchton (New 
York: Cambridge, 1995). 
43Cf. Susan Elizabeth Schreiner, The Theater of His Glory: Nature and the 
Natural Order in the Thought of John Calvin (Durham, NC: Labyrinth Press, 
1991). 
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the sufficiency of God’s revelation in scripture, rendering theological appeal to 
the “book of nature” clearly subordinate and surely not essential for basic 
Christian life. 
 This is a point where the “Anglican” approach to theological reflection 
diverged from more staunchly Protestant approaches.44 The roots of this 
difference go back to Richard Hooker, who argued that, while scripture is 
sufficient for the basic knowledge of salvation, all Christians should be 
encouraged to seek the fullness of understanding and felicity, which is derived 
from conjoined study of scripture and nature.45 This emphasis underlies the 
significant interest in natural theology that emerged in England in the middle of 
the seventeen century and carried through Wesley’s life into the nineteenth 
century.46 While strongest in Anglican circles, the interest was evident as well 
among moderate dissenting writers like Richard Baxter.47 Wesley drew upon 
works in natural theology from both circles for his theological reflections 
interspersed through Survey of the Wisdom of God. 
 But this brings us to an important question. Why did Wesley designate the 
Survey as a work in natural philosophy instead of natural theology? Part of the 
answer may have been his recognition that the scope of natural theology was 
traditionally broader than natural philosophy (including reflections on natural law 
and the human soul, which play little part in the Survey.) But a more important 
reason was surely his recognition of the difference in amount of attention given to 
nature itself in the works he consulted of each genre. Works in natural philosophy 
devoted the majority of their time to describing the natural world, usually 
gathering their explicit theological reflections in a short section at the end (like  
 
44The term “Anglican” is increasingly restricted by scholars to naming a 
set of emphases firmly in place only by the beginning of the eighteenth century in 
England; cf. John Walsh & Stephen Taylor, “Introduction: the Church and 
Anglicanism in the ‘long’ Eighteenth Century,” in The Church of England, c. 
1689–c. 1833, edited by Walsh, et al. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), 1–64. 
45Richard G. Olson, “Science and Religion in England, 1590–1740,” in 
Science and Religion, 1450–1900 (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2004), 84–91. 
46In addition to Olson, “Science and Religion in England”; see David M. 
Knight, “The Rise and Fall of Natural Theology,” in Natural Science Books in 
English 1600–1900 (New York: Praeger, 1972), 47–62. 
47See Dewey D. Wallace Jr., “Natural Theology Among the Dissenters: 
Richard Baxter and His Circle,” in American Society of Church History Papers 
for 1992 Meeting (Portland: Theological Research Exchange Network, 1993), 1–
38. 
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Newton’s “General Scholium”). By contrast, efforts in natural theology—like 
William Derham’s Physico-Theology and Astro-Theology48—were organized 
around and dominated by theological reflection, interspersing brief appeals to the 
natural world as springboards for or evidence backing their theological claims. On 
this spectrum, Wesley’s Survey lines up much closer to the “natural philosophy” 
pole. 
 The work that Wesley chose to frame and provide the largest portion of 
text for the first edition of Survey was a classic example of natural philosophy, 
published in Latin by Johann Franz Buddeus while a professor of philosophy at 
the University of Halle.49 The bulk of this textbook is devoted to surveying the 
natural world—beginning with the human body, then moving to other animals; 
then to plants, fossils, and the physical elements of earth, fire, and water, finally 
turning toward the heavens, considering air, meteors, and cosmology. Wesley 
retained each of these sections in Survey, although he omits a subsequent section 
devoted to debates in physics50 (remember his limitation to “describing,” not 
“accounting for”). His abridgements within the various sections are infrequent, 
and sometimes amusing—such as the deletion of descriptions of human 
reproductive organs.51 More striking are the additions. Wesley incorporated into 
Survey entire new chapters describing birds, fish, and reptiles, as well as 
numerous examples of natural species and phenomena. Apparently judging that 
the Buddeus text did not provide enough description of the wonders of God’s 
creation, Wesley scoured a number of books and journals to supplement. If I 
might suggest an analogy—just as Wesley exhorted his people to immerse 
themselves in the whole of scripture, not rest content with a few proof texts, he 
was inviting them to contemplate broadly the “book of nature” (natural 
philosophy), not render it simply a source for select evidences of divine design 
(natural theology). 
 Of course, Wesley did believe that the natural world bore evidence of 
God’s wisdom and design. So there is a theological component in his  
 
48William Derham, Physico-Theology; or, A Demonstration of the Being 
and Attributes of God from His Works of Creation (London: William Innys, 
1713); and Astro-Theology; or, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of 
God, from a Survey of the Heavens (London: William Innys, 1715). 
49Johann Franz Buddeus, Elementa Philosophiae Theoretica (Halle: 
Glauche-Hallensis, 1706). 
50Ibid., 253–323. 
51Compare ibid., 70–72, to Survey, 1:96. 
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Survey. But several things should be noted about this component. To begin with, 
Wesley omits the final section of Buddeus’s text, which was devoted to 
metaphysical description and debates about spirits, angels, and God.52 In its place 
Wesley intersperses through the Survey occasional theological interludes that 
provide more limited reflection on the wisdom and goodness of God as manifest 
in the aspect of the natural world just described. While a few of these reflections 
are original to Wesley, he draws most from other writers, including leading 
exemplars of natural theology like William Derham, Thomas Morgan, Bernard 
Nieuwentyt, and John Ray.53 
 Given his dependence on so many works of natural theology, the question 
recurs of why Wesley did not call the Survey a natural theology. One other reason 
for his hesitance is awareness of a difference in tone. Prominent works of “natural 
theology” in Wesley’s day were sliding from the more modest classical stance of 
seeking to confirm belief into the more ambitious Enlightenment stance of 
evidentialist apologetics.54 The latter is a stance which assumes that the path to 
reliable knowledge requires first setting aside all belief, then accepting as truth 
only those claims for which there is undeniable or objectively compelling 
evidence. On this model, the prime task of natural theology becomes 
demonstrating God’s existence, not merely reflecting on evidence of God’s 
wisdom and character; and the standard to be attained becomes certainty, not 
merely reasonable consonance. This model could also encourage more strident 
rhetoric. John Ray’s Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of Creation is an 
example. Peppered through this work are comments that anyone who does not 
recognize that the world was produced by divine reason must be “stupid as the 
basest beasts,” “stupid as the dirt one walks on,” “forsaken of reason,” and 
“sottish.”55 
 Wesley clearly recognized this shift in some of his sources, and he was not 
ready to follow. But this fact has not been broadly appreciated,  
 
52See ibid., 326–92. 
53In addition to Derham’s Physico-Theology and Astro-Theology, see 
Thomas Morgan, Physico-Theology (London: T. Cox, 1741); Bernard 
Nieuwentyt, The Religious Philosopher; or, The Right Use of Contemplating the 
Works of the Creator (London: Senex & Taylor, 1718); and John Ray, The 
Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of Creation, 4th edn., enlarged (London: 
Samuel Smith, 1704 – the last edition published during his life). 
54On this distinction, see again Wolterstorff, “Migration of Theistic 
Arguments.” 
55Cf. Ray, Wisdom of God, 39, 47, 122–23, 249, 389. 
  42
                                                
because there has been little attention paid to Wesley’s selective appropriation of 
his sources.56 As one example, while Wesley incorporated into his Survey at least 
four extracts from Ray’s Wisdom of God, he chose none with the type of strident 
apologetic agenda just noted.57 William Derham’s Astro-Theology would serve as 
a more extensive example. The setting for this work is the claim in Psalm 19 that 
the heavens declare God’s glory. Derham declared his purpose as showing: 
 
That the observation of the Psalmist is agreeable to experience, is 
manifest from the deductions which all nations have made from 
God’s works, particularly from those of the heavens; namely, that 
there is a God; and that such as have pretended to atheism and 
have deduced God’s works from chance, etc. are singular and 
monstrous in their opinions.58 
 
 Wesley incorporates a section of Astro-Theology in his Survey that 
comprises nearly a third of Derham’s original text, though significantly 
abridged.59 None of the selections chosen have the strong apologetic tone. More 
importantly, Wesley edits out the few places in the section chosen that echo this 
tone. For example, Wesley deletes Derham’s rhetorical flourish about the 
stupidity of those who cannot see evidence of God in the regularity of motion in 
the heavens.60 
 When read alongside works like Ray’s Wisdom of God and Derham’s 
Astro-Theology, the theological reflections that Wesley incorporates into Survey 
can only be described as modest in their tone and agenda. While these reflections 
can speak of nature displaying God’s wisdom or providential care, they rarely 
verge on portraying this knowledge as so evident that no rational person could 
reject it. The general tone is captured well in Wesley’s conclusion, which 
he drew from Matthew Hale’s “Account of a Steward.” This summary values 
consideration of the  
 
56Felleman, “Evidence of Things Not Seen,” 90–92, makes a beginning in 
this direction. 
57See Survey, 1:308–12, which incorporates Ray, Wisdom of God, 134–42, 
145–49; and Survey, 2:136–40, which incorporates Ray, Wisdom of God, 22–31, 
61–63. 
58Derham, Astro-Theology, 2–3 (emphasis added to highlight 
Enlightenment tone). 
59Survey, 3:308–12 is an abridgement of Astro-Theology, 50–131 (which 
has very small pages). 
60Compare Survey, 3:311 to Astro-Theology, 99–100. 
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“book of God’s works” not as the foundation for belief in God or God’s various 
attributes, but as a means of strengthening the faith, reverence, and love 
awakened by God’s word, a means of building nascent convictions into 
demonstrative convictions. This resonates with classical natural theology at its 
best, much more than with the ambitious evidentialist apologetics of many of 
Wesley’s peers. 
 This is an important point to recognize in light of Michael Buckley’s 
argument that the ambitious apologetic approach paved the way for modern 
atheism by virtue of the mechanistic theism that it made central to much Christian 
teaching by the early nineteenth century. A God who is first and foremost the 
architect and supreme contriver behind nature’s orderly processes is not only 
subject to being disproved at any moment by alternative accounts for those 
processes, but also directly blameworthy for any perceived deficiencies in the 
processes.61 Moreover, by focusing on the apparent design in nature as the 
foundation for belief in this God, the evidentialist approach placed a religious 
burden on the sciences which they could not bear.62 
 John Hedley Brooke, Professor of Science and Religion at Oxford 
University, has recently argued that Wesley’s Survey remains of theological 
interest today precisely because its modest claims are less prone to the dangers 
Buckley highlights in more evidentialist natural theologies.63 I would concur. I 
suggest that—to the degree that we have imbibed this characteristic 
commitment—Wesley’s present heirs will find themselves resonating in the 
renewed debates over natural theology more with modest approaches like that of 
John Polkinghorne than with the evidentialist agenda of the Intelligent Design 
camp.64 
 
61See Michael J. Buckley, At the Origins of Modern Atheism (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 1987), esp. 338. 
62Cf. John Hedley Brooke, Science and Religion: Some Historical 
Perspectives. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 195. 
63Cf. John Hedley Brooke, “Science and Dissent: Some Historiographical 
Issues,” in Science and Dissent in England, 1688–1945, edited by Paul Wood 
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004),19–37; here, 21. 
64See in this regard John Polkinghorne, “Where is Natural Theology 
Today?” Science and Christian Belief 18 (2006): 169–79, esp. 171–72. 
Concerning the Intelligent Design camp, the issue is not whether their specific 
“filter” for discerning design is adequate; the deeper concern is their desire for 
evidence of design that is “fully scientific” and “universally valid,” in explicit 
contrast with classical natural theology.  
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2.  Calling for Epistemic Humility in BOTH Theology and Science.  The 
modest tone of the theological reflections in Survey is not just an evangelistic 
strategy. It reflects an epistemological conviction that Wesley imbibed with his 
initial academic training and that deepened and broadened over time. In response 
to growing awareness of the lack of absolute certainty in most human knowing, 
seventeenth-century theologians like William Chillingsworth, John Tillotson, and 
Edward Stillingfleet began to argue that absolute certainty was not necessary. In 
its place, they advocated a “common sense” approach of asking only for 
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. This allowed them to affirm theological 
claims as reasonable that were not amenable to strict deductive logic.65 
 Wesley was introduced to this stance in his Oxford years and embraced its 
implications over time. Ultimately, Wesley became convinced that all human 
understandings of our experience, tradition, and scripture itself are “opinions.” 
They are interpretations of their subject matter. While that subject matter may 
exist as objective fact, our interpretations of it remain fallible, and should remain 
open to the possibility of further confirmation or modification.66 Wesley’s mature 
sense of this human reality is captured in his 1750 sermon “Catholic Spirit.”  
 In Wesley’s emerging Enlightenment setting, most folk welcomed such 
recognition of the fallibility of theological claims, with its implication of modesty 
and openness to further dialogue. Where Wesley ran into opposition was when he 
suggested that scientific claims were in the same epistemological camp. This 
assumption on Wesley’s part was clear in the Survey from its first edition in 1763, 
because scattered through this and later editions are accounts of disagreements 
over both specific issues like the size of the moon and broader issues like 
cosmological models. In these accounts Wesley typically refused to choose sides, 
commenting instead on the limits of human knowledge. His reserve triggered a 
letter from a writer calling himself “Philosophaster,” published in late 1764 in the 
London Magazine, which invoked “clear facts” to dismiss several  
 
65See Henry G. Van Leeuwen, The Problem of Certainty in English 
Thought: 1630–90 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970). 
66For more on this, see Randy L. Maddox, “Opinion, Religion, and 
‘Catholic Spirit’: John Wesley on Theological Integrity,” Asbury Theological 
Journal 47.1 (1992): 63–87; and Maddox, “The Enriching Role of Experience,” in 
Wesley and the Quadrilateral, edited by W. S. Gunter (Nashville: Abingdon, 
1997), 107–27. 
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alternative positions in these debates and lampooned Wesley’s caution.67 
Wesley’s published response worked through the debated topics again, 
underlining the continuing disagreements among current authors, and concluded 
by admonishing the writer: 
 
Permit me, sir, to give you one piece of advice. Be not so positive, 
especially with regard to things which are neither easy nor 
necessary to be determined. I ground this advice on my own 
experience. When I was young I was sure of everything. In a few 
years, having been mistaken a thousand times, I was not half so 
sure of most things as before. At present I am hardly sure of any 
thing, but what God has revealed to man.68 
 
Wesley included his letter in subsequent editions of Survey, followed by extracts 
from writers like Robert Boyle who similarly emphasized the disagreements 
among and limitations of reigning accounts of nature. Wesley prefaced the 
extracts with the insistence that “I do not deny, but only doubt the present system 
of astronomy.”69 
 It is important to add that Wesley’s hesitance to claim certainty about a 
particular cosmological model was not provisional. He was not just waiting until 
conclusive evidence was found. Rather, his epistemic humility was rooted in the 
theological conviction that “God hath so done his works that we may admire and 
adore, but we cannot search them out to perfection.”70 And it was reinforced by 
his philosophical conviction of the fallibility of our understanding of what God 
has revealed—whether in the book of scripture or the book of nature. 
 Wesley’s mature epistemic humility was out of step with the push of the 
Enlightenment for certainty, and particularly with the emerging modern approach 
to science.71 But it resonates with a two-sided call for epistemic  
 
67Philosophaster, “To Mr. John Wesley,” London Magazine 34 (Nov. 
1764): 570–73. 
68Letter to the Editor of the London Magazine (January 1, 1765), London 
Magazine 35 (1765): 26–29, quote on 28. Philosophaster’s reply to Wesley was 
published in London Magazine 35 (1765): 128–30. 
69Wesley’s letter is found in Survey 3:321–28, quote on 327. The extracts 
occupy 3:328–55, with Wesley’s opening observation on 328. 
70Wesley, Preface, §5, Survey, 1:vii; in Works (Jackson) 14:301. This is 
the concluding line of his explication of the restricted goal of Survey quoted 
earlier. See also Sermon 69, “The Imperfection of Human Knowledge,” I.5–13, 
Works 2:571–77. 
71Cf. Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity 
(New York: Free Press, 1990). 
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humility in the current science and religion dialogue. One side of this call is 
addressed to theology, with scientists and theologians desiring a “humility 
theology” that operates on the assumption there is more to know about God and 
about the natural world than is now known or ever will be known.72 The other 
side of the call challenges the hubris of “scientism,” which seeks to account for all 
reality—including religion and ethics—on purely naturalist grounds.73 I believe 
that Wesley’s precedent would encourage his present heirs to support both of 
these sides, and perhaps press the second side a little further. 
 Most critiques of scientism focus on admonishing science to “stick to its 
field,” but say less about the importance of epistemic humility even within its 
proper field. Wesley was clearly no precursor of the radical skepticism of Paul 
Feyerabend, but his stress on epistemic finitude strikes some resonance with the 
emphasis on the contextuality of scientific paradigms introduced into recent 
philosophy of science by Thomas Kuhn. In my view, the strongest resonance with 
the balance in Wesley’s comments on “Catholic Spirit” among current 
philosophies of science is to be found in Imre Lakatos’s model of progressive 
research programs.74 
 
3.  Convinced of the Importance of “Honoring the Dialogue.”  Given 
Wesley’s awareness of the fallibility of his “opinions” or interpretations of 
matters under consideration, he found in dialogue the most helpful way to test 
opinions, seeking those which are most adequate. For theological opinions this 
involved overlapping dialogues: Wesley modeled testing them in an ongoing 
dialogue between scripture, tradition, experience of life and the world, and reason, 
all read in dialogue with other interpreters. When confronted with an apparent 
conflict between scripture and experience, for example, his way forward proved 
to be not simply debating which was more authoritative, but engaging in the 
difficult (and often lengthy) reconsideration of his interpretations of both of 
these—and of tradition—often prodded by alternatives defended by others, until 
an interpretation emerged that did justice to all.75 
 
72See Robert L. Herrmann, ed., God, Science & Humility: Ten Scientists 
Consider Humility Theology (Philadelphia: Templeton Foundation Press, 2000). 
73See Mikael Stenmark, Scientism: Science, Ethics, and Religion 
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2001).  
74A good introduction to these alternatives can be found in Chalmers, 
What is. . . Science? 
75In this description I am trying to provide a more dynamic and dialogical 
account of what is often termed the “Wesleyan Quadrilateral.” 
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 I want to sketch an instance where Wesley’s dialogue with the “science” 
of his day—the carefully reflective experience of the natural world—helped him 
to revise a traditional theological viewpoint, moving to a stance that could do 
better justice to scripture. While scripture speaks of God’s ultimate salvific goal 
as the “new heavens and earth” (i.e., transformation of everything in the 
universe), a variety of influences led Christians through the first millennium to 
assume increasingly that our final state is “heaven above.” The latter was seen as 
a realm where human spirits dwelling in ethereal bodies join eternally with all 
other spiritual beings—a category that did not include animals!—in continuous 
worship of the Ultimate Spiritual Being.76 By contrast, they assumed that the 
physical universe, which we abandon at death, would eventually be annihilated. 
Wesley imbibed this understanding of our final state in his upbringing, and 
through much of his ministry it was presented as obvious and unproblematic.  
 In the last decade of his life, however, Wesley reclaimed the biblical 
imagery of God’s cosmic renewal, shifting his focus from “heaven above” to the 
future new creation.77 After a tentative defense of animals having “souls” in 
1775, he issued a bold affirmation of final salvation for animals in the 1781 
sermon “The General Deliverance.”78 While not without precedent, this sermon 
was unusual for its time and is often cited as a pioneer effort in reaffirming the 
doctrine of animal salvation in the Western church. Broadening the scope even 
further, Wesley’s 1785 sermon on “The New Creation” refused to limit God’s 
redemptive purposes to sentient beings, insisting that the very elements of our 
current universe will be present in the new creation, though they will be 
dramatically improved over current conditions.79 
 What contributed to Wesley’s reclaiming of the biblical theme of the 
cosmic scope of redemption? One factor was clearly a concern about animal 
suffering and theodicy. Wesley shared the sentiments of his friend George 
Cheyne: 
 
76For a good history of the ascendancy of this model, see Colleen 
McDannell & Bernhard Lang, Heaven: A History (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1988). 
77For more details on this transition, see Randy L. Maddox, “Nurturing the 
New Creation: Reflections on a Wesleyan Trajectory,” in Wesleyan Perspectives 
on the New Creation, edited by M. Douglas Meeks (Nashville: Kingswood Books, 
2004), 21–52; here, 43–49. 
78Sermon 60, “The General Deliverance,” Works 2:437–50. 
79Sermon 64, “The New Creation,” Works 2:500–10. 
  48
                                                
 
It is utterly incredible that any creature . . . should come into this 
state of being and suffering for no other purpose than we see them 
attain here.… There must be some infinitely beautiful, wise, and 
good scene remaining for all sentient and intelligent beings, the 
discovery of which will ravish and astonish us one day.80 
 
Wesley’s proposal about this scene would likely have astonished even Cheyne! 
Wesley had long doubted the adequacy of a theodicy that justified God’s 
goodness in permitting the possibility of the fall by contending that God would 
restore things to their pre-fallen condition. In his view, a truly loving God would 
only permit the present evil in the world if an even better outcome might be 
achieved by allowing this possibility than without it. Thus, he insisted that in our 
resurrected state God would shower humanity with greater capacities and 
blessings than Adam and Eve ever enjoyed.81 In “General Deliverance” he 
extended this proposal to the lower animals, suggesting that, as compensation for 
the evil they experienced in this life, God would bestow greater abilities on them 
in the new creation, including perhaps even the ability to relate to God as humans 
do now!82 
 While this proposal may strike us as fanciful, and ill-fitting to scripture, I 
want to stress that Wesley was brought to it through his deeper engagement with 
leading works in natural philosophy that utilized the model of the “chain of 
beings” to organize their study. Recall that this model arranges the various 
“beings” in a hierarchal progression of relative excellence of abilities. For 
example, fish were higher in the chain than plants, dogs higher than fish, humans 
higher than dogs, and celestial beings higher than humans. Moreover, a central 
assumption of the model was that the only type of cosmos fitting for a Perfect 
Being to produce was one in which every conceivable niche was occupied by its 
appropriate type of being. The work of natural philosophers became identifying 
and placing each creature in its appropriate niche. 
 Lest we dismiss it too quickly, I would note that Clarence Glacken has 
argued that the modern ecological ideas of the unity of nature and the balance and 
harmony of nature trace their roots to this model of the chain  
 
80George Cheyne, An Essay on Regimen (London: Rivington, 1740), 86–
87. 
81See Sermon 59, “God’s Love to Fallen Man,” Works 2:423–35; and 
Sermon 63, “The General Spread of the Gospel,” §27, Works 2:499. 
82See Sermon 60, “General Deliverance,” §III.6–7, Works 2:448. 
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of beings.83 Glacken particularly highlights the role of John Ray and Charles 
Bonnet in adapting the model to frame surveys of the burgeoning knowledge of 
the natural world in the eighteenth century. Wesley was familiar with Ray’s 
Wisdom of God from the early 1730s. He encountered the writings of Charles 
Bonnet, a prominent Swiss naturalist, in the early 1770s.84 It was through Bonnet 
that Wesley gained deeper appreciation for the implications of the chain of 
beings. Indeed, he came to value the model so highly that he incorporated an 
abridgement of Bonnet’s two-volume overview of the chain of beings into Survey 
in 1777.85 
 Wesley almost certainly took the suggestion of animals gaining greater 
powers in the next life from Bonnet, who proposed that the entire chain of beings 
would be moved up a notch at the end of this age.86 A more significant notion 
that Wesley clearly embraced from Bonnet concerns our human connection with 
the rest of the chain. He retained in his abridgment of Bonnet a response to the 
suggestion that it would be better if humans were angels, which counsels: 
 
Confess your error and acknowledge that every being is endued 
with a perfection suited to the ends of its creation. It would cease 
to answer that end the very moment it ceased to be what it is. By 
changing its nature it would change its place and that which it 
occupied in the universal hierarchy ought still to be the residence 
of a being resembling it, otherwise harmony would be destroyed. 
In the assemblage of all the orders of relative perfections consists 
the absolute perfection of this whole, concerning which God said 
“that it was good.”87 
 
 
83Clarence J. Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore: Nature and Culture 
in Western Thought from Ancient Times to the End of the Eighteenth Century 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), esp. 379. 
84Vol. 2 of Charles Bonnet, La Palingénésie philosophique; or Idées sur 
l’état passé et sur l’état futur des etres vivans (2nd edition. Munster: Philip Henry 
Perrenon, 1770), is among the books of Wesley’s library that have survived, in the 
collection at Wesley’s house, London. This volume is signed by Wesley and dated 
as obtained in 1772. 
85Charles Bonnet, The Contemplation of Nature, 2 vols. (London: 
Longman & Becket, 1766); cf. Survey, 4:60–333. 
86Bonnet makes this proposal model in Palingénésie philosophique, Parts 
1–5 (1:187–97) and 14 (2:62–84). 
87Wesley, Survey, 4:62. 
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If this is taken seriously, there can be no eschatological ideal that limits salvation 
to humanity (even in the subtle form of stressing that humans are “microcosms” 
of the whole cosmos). It would be a thwarting of God’s creative will and a 
deprivation of all concerned! 
 I am convinced that Wesley’s pondering of this point as he read and 
abridged Bonnet in the mid-1770s played a significant role in his strong 
reclaiming of cosmic redemption shortly thereafter. As an Anglican theologian, 
raised with deep appreciation for the conjoined witness of the book of scripture 
and the book of nature, Wesley was open to welcoming an insight from the 
science of his day that brought back into focus a biblical (and early Christian) 
theme that had been obscured. He would surely encourage his twenty-first century 
progeny to exercise a similar openness in their theological reflection. 
 
4.  Concerned to Push for Appropriate Consonance.   I hasten to add that 
Wesley would immediately reject any suggestion that the challenge to existing 
interpretations moves in only one direction—from science to theology. While he 
did not consider it his role to advance explanatory accounts in natural philosophy, 
he was more than ready to encourage reconsideration of accounts that appeared to 
conflict with central theological convictions or broadly-shared understandings of 
scripture. 
 An appropriate case in point is Wesley’s response to David Hartley’s 
Observations on Man, published in 1749.88 Hartley was a physician and known to 
Wesley through their mutual friend, John Byrom. Hartley also knew Charles 
Wesley, and presented him a signed copy of Observations shortly after it was 
published.89 Hartley’s study is an early work in physical psychology, which 
presents all of the operations of the soul—all thoughts, volitions, feelings, etc.—
as dependent upon vibrations of fibers in the brain (at least, as long as the soul 
remains connected to the body). Significantly, Hartley commented in the preface 
that he had slowly and reluctantly reached the conclusion that this integral 
association entailed a thorough determinism of all human experience and 
behavior.90 
 
88David Hartley, Observations on Man: His Frame, His Duty, and His 
Expectations, 2 vols. (London: Charles Hitch & Stephen Austen, 1749). 
89The copy is now part of the holdings of the Methodist Archives in the 
John Rylands University Library (shelf number MAW CW66–67). It bears the 
inscription “To the Rev. Charles Wesley from the author. June 26, 1753” as well 
as Charles’s signature. 
90See Hartley, Observations, 1:vi. 
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 Wesley waited to respond publicly to Hartley’s study, but eventually made 
it a main target of Thoughts upon Necessity (1774) and an abridged version, “A 
Thought on Necessity” (1780).91 In his response it is clear that this instance of 
dialogue with natural philosophy had not led Wesley to revise his theological 
emphasis on authentic liberty in human willing. Rather, he stressed his judgment 
that a thorough determinist account of human behavior undercuts both human 
moral accountability and the justice of God in condemning or rewarding human 
actions. These were central theological convictions that he could not easily set 
aside or credibly interpret in a way compatible with determinism. Yet, Wesley 
allowed that Hartley’s emphasis on the physical dimension of human 
consciousness and volition contained “a great deal of truth.”92 Wesley’s obvious 
desire was to affirm the full participation of our physical dimension in inclining 
humans to various states and actions, while maintaining some modest ability to 
resist or refuse automatic enactment of these inclinations.93 His ultimate solution 
in response to Hartley was to insist that God, as sovereign, surely had the power 
to interrupt the causal chain.94 
 This solution is patently inadequate. It simply substitutes a supernatural 
account of human behavior for a natural account. Wesley would have been better 
served by further elaboration of his notion of “liberty” as a category of human 
nature. But my goal is not to demonstrate that Wesley was able to develop full 
consonance between theology and the science of his day. It is enough to show that 
he was concerned to push for consonance, in part by encouraging reconsideration 
of certain models in science. 
 Wesley’s precedent leaves little room for his current progeny to rest 
content with the supposed peace of a “separate but equal” relationship between 
theology and science, such as Stephen Gould’s proposal of “nonoverlapping 
magisteria.”95 It would encourage us instead to engage reigning models in the 
natural sciences in honest dialogue, reflecting on  
 
91Wesley, Thoughts upon Necessity (London: Hawes, 1774), in Works 
(Jackson) 10:457–74; and  “A Thought on Necessity,” Arminian Magazine 3 
(1780): 485–92, in Works (Jackson) 10:474–80. 
92Wesley, Thoughts upon Necessity, IV.2, Works (Jackson) 10:469.  
93See his discussion of “liberty” in ibid., III.9, Works (Jackson) 10:468–
69.  
94See ibid., IV.4, Works (Jackson) 10:473. Also in “Thought on 
Necessity,” VI.1, Works (Jackson) 10:478. 
95A brief sense of this proposal, and the alternative stress on consonance, 
can be found in Peters, “Science and Theology.” 
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where these models resonate with our deep theological convictions and where 
they create (or, appear to create) significant dissonance. It would also encourage 
those among us with the appropriate expertise to engage in the important and 
difficult work of proposing and building support for alternative accounts, within 
the relevant sciences themselves, in those areas of dissonance. 
 We could name many examples where this kind of work is underway 
among Wesley’s progeny and in the larger church. To stick to the focus of 
Wesley’s concern relating to David Hartley, I will limit myself to suggesting that 
Wesley would be gratified by efforts like those of Warren Brown and his 
associates who are seeking to elaborate a neurobiological account of human 
experience and volition that takes with full seriousness the determinative elements 
while also elucidating a modest, but real, element of liberty (“agent causation”).96 
 
5.  Countering the Tendency to Anthropocentric Exploitation.  One of 
the central dynamics that transformed natural philosophy into modern science 
over the course of the eighteenth century was the increasing adoption of Francis 
Bacon’s perspective that the value of any study of nature was proportionate to the 
technological benefits it provided for human control and exploitation of the 
natural world.97 Wesley was familiar with champions of this anthropocentric, 
exploitive emphasis in scientific investigation. He had to look no further than 
William Derham, who insisted: “We can, if need be, ransack the whole globe. . 
.penetrate into the bowels of the earth, descend to the bottom of the deep, travel to 
the farthest regions of this world, to acquire wealth, to increase our knowledge, or 
even only to please our eye or fancy.”98 
 This is another of the passages from Derham that was not selected by 
Wesley for inclusion in his Survey. Nor does anything in its vein from other 
sources appear there. Part of the reason is that Wesley imbibed more  
 
96See particularly Warren S. Brown, “Cognitive Neuroscience and a 
Wesleyan View of the Person,” in Companions and Apprentices, edited by 
Maxine Walker (San Diego: Point Loma Press, 1999), 31–39; and Nancey 
Murphy & Warren Brown, Did My Neurons Make Me Do It? Philosophical and 
Neurobiological Perspectives on Moral Responsibility and Free Will (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2007). 
97For an incisive analysis of this dimension of Bacon, see Carolyn 
Merchant, The Death of Nature (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1980), 164–90. 
98Derham, Physico-Theology, 112.  
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deeply than Derham the convictions of the chain of beings model of nature. While 
this model highlights (as ecologists would today) a range of ways that any 
particular species might contribute to the well-being of others above or below it in 
the chain, it also insists that every species has intrinsic value and a right to exist 
for its own purposes. John Ray, who was deeply shaped by this model, 
emphasized the relevant implication: “It is a generally received opinion that all 
this visible world was created for man, that man is the end of creation, as if there 
were no other end of any creature but some way or other to be serviceable to man. 
… Yet wise men nowadays think otherwise.”99 Ray offered Wesley a model of 
modest anthropocentrism.100 
 Wesley appropriated this model in a way that moved beyond Ray through 
his distinctive emphasis regarding our role as “stewards.” This emphasis is seen 
most clearly in his instructions on the use of money, where he criticizes any 
suggestion that resources put at our disposal are for us to use however we see fit. 
Wesley insists instead that everything belongs ultimately to God; that it is placed 
in our care to use as God directs; and that God directs us to use it for the benefit 
of others once our basic needs are met.101 Extending this principle to the rest of 
creation, the focus of Wesley’s environmental ethic is better characterized as 
theocentric than anthropocentric. He portrayed the ideal relationship of humanity 
with creation (modeled by Adam in the Garden of Eden) as one of modest 
stewardship, where we devote our distinctive gifts to upholding God’s intentions 
for the balance and flourishing of all creation.102 
 Most in Wesley’s day shared his assumption of the idyllic nature of the 
original creation, with peace abounding between all creatures and humans 
possessing the knowledge to promote the thriving of the whole. They also shared 
the recognition that this was very unlike the world in which we live now, with 
“nature red in tooth and claw” (Tennyson) and humans largely at the mercy of the 
forces of nature. Differences emerged  
 
99Ray, Wisdom of God, 127–28. 
100See ibid, 176–77, note 39. Cf. John Hedley Brooke, “‘Wise Men 
Nowadays Think Otherwise’: John Ray, Natural Theology, and the Meanings of 
Anthropomorphism,” Notes Received by the Royal Society of London 54 (2000): 
199–213. 
101See Sermon 28, “Sermon on the Mount VIII,” §§11, 25–26, Works 
1:618–19, 628–29; Sermon 50, “The Use of Money,” Works 2:266–80; and 
Sermon 51, “The Good Steward,” §I.1, Works 2:283. 
102See Sermon 60, “The General Deliverance,” §I.6, Works 2:444. 
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around the implications drawn from the present condition for human interaction 
with the rest of nature. Many resigned themselves to the situation, as long as we 
are in the present world.  
Among the ones who believed that change was possible, the most 
significant distinction emerged between those (like Francis Bacon) who 
championed the mandate to reclaim the mastery over creation that was lost in the 
fall, and those (like Wesley) who pleaded for resuming the loving stewardship of 
creation that we inverted in the fall.103 While the first two alternatives could 
acquiesce to (or even justify) the aggressive domination of other creatures by 
humans, Wesley is representative of the third alternative in his portrayal of such 
domination as the epitome of the fallen practices that must be set aside.104 Deeply 
aware of how much damage we have done, the stewardship that Wesley called for 
us to resume is not only modest but chastened.105 
 This ideal, alongside Wesley naming his compendium of natural 
philosophy a Survey of the Wisdom of God in Creation, suggests a very different 
rationale for the study of nature (or science) than that of Bacon. We should seek 
this knowledge, not to increase our ability to exploit nature, but to increase our 
awareness of the wondrous range of creation and deepen our sensitivity to our 
integral connection with it all—so that we might more effectively imitate the God 
whose mercy is over all his works.106 Progeny like that would surely rejoice 
Wesley’s heart! 
 
103This distinction is highlighted in Peter Harrison, “Subduing the Earth: 
Genesis 1, Early Modern Science, and the Exploitation of Nature,” Journal of 
Religion 79 (1999): 86–109; esp. 102–3. 
104See esp. his description of the negative impact of humanity upon 
creation in Sermon 60, “The General Deliverance,” II, Works 2:442–45. 
105For more on Wesley’s precedent for environmental stewardship, see 
Randy L. Maddox, “Anticipating the New Creation: Wesleyan Foundations for 
Holistic Mission,” Asbury Journal 62 (2007): 49–66. 
106Cf. Sermon 60, “General Deliverance,” §III.10, Works 2:449. 
